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Abstract
Linear relaxation based perturbation analysis (LiRPA) for neural networks, which computes provable
linear bounds of output neurons given a certain amount of input perturbation, has become a core component
in robustness verification and certified defense. The majority of LiRPA-based methods only consider simple
feed-forward networks and it needs particular manual derivations and implementations when extended to
other architectures. In this paper, we develop an automatic framework to enable perturbation analysis on
any neural network structures, by generalizing exiting LiRPA algorithms such as CROWN to operate on
general computational graphs. The flexibility, differentiability and ease of use of our framework allow us
to obtain state-of-the-art results on LiRPA based certified defense on fairly complicated networks like
DenseNet, ResNeXt and Transformer that are not supported by prior work. Our framework also enables loss
fusion, a technique that significantly reduces the computational complexity of LiRPA for certified defense.
For the first time, we demonstrate LiRPA based certified defense on Tiny ImageNet and Downscaled
ImageNet where previous approaches cannot scale to due to the relatively large number of classes. Our
work also yields an open-source library for the community to apply LiRPA to areas beyond certified
defense without much LiRPA expertise, e.g., we create a neural network with a provably flat optimization
landscape. Our open source library is available at https://github.com/KaidiXu/auto_LiRPA.
1 Introduction
Bounding the range of a neural network outputs given a certain amount of input perturbation has become an
important theme for neural network verification and certified adversarial defense [47, 30, 44, 55]. However,
computing the exact bounds for output neurons is usually intractable [20]. Recent research studies have
developed perturbation analysis bounds that are sound, computationally feasible, and relatively tight [47,
52, 39, 46, 37, 45]. For a neural network function f(x) ∈ R, to study its behaviour at x0 with bounded
perturbation δ such that x = x0 + δ ∈ S (e.g., S is a `p norm ball around x0), these works provide two linear
functions f(x) := a>x + b and f(x) := a>x + b that are guaranteed lower and upper bounds respectively
for output neurons w.r.t. the input under perturbation: f(x) ≤ f(x) ≤ f(x)(∀x ∈ S). We refer to this line
of work as a Linear Relaxation based Perturbation Analysis (LiRPA). Beyond its usage in neural network
verification and certified defense, LiRPA is capable to serve as a general toolbox to understand the behavior of
DNNs within a predefined input region, and has been demonstrated useful for interpretation and explanation
of DNNs [23, 36].
To compute LiRPA bounds, the first step is to obtain linear relaxations of any non-linear units [52, 35]
(e.g., activation functions) in a network. Then, these relaxations need to be “glued” together according to
the network structure to obtain the final bounds. Early developments of LiRPA focused on feed-forward
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networks, and it has been extended to a few more complicated network structures for real-world applications.
For example, [49] implemented LiRPA for ResNet on computer vision tasks; [57] extended [47] to graph
convolutional networks; [23] and [36] extended CROWN [52] to recurrent neural networks and Transformers
respectively. Unfortunately, each of these works extends LiRPA with an ad-hoc implementation that only
works for a specific network architecture. This is similar to the “pre-automatic differentiation” era where
researchers have to implement gradient computation by themselves for their designed network structure. Since
LiRPA is significantly more complicated than backpropagation, non-experts in neural network verification can
find it very challenging to understand and use LiRPA for their purpose.
Our paper takes a big leap towards making LiRPA a useful tool for general machine learning audience,
by generalize existing LiRPA algorithms to general computational graphs. Our framework is a superset of
many existing works [48, 52, 46, 23, 36], and our automatic perturbation analysis algorithm is analogous
to automatic differentiation. Our algorithm can compute LiRPA automatically for a given PyTorch model
without manual derivation or implementation for the specific network architecture. Importantly, our LiRPA
bounds are differentiable which allows efficient training of these bounds. In addition, our proposed framework
enables the following contributions:
• The flexibility and ease-of-use of our framework allow us to easily obtain state-of-the-art certified defense
results for fairly complicated networks, such as, DenseNet, ResNeXt and Transfomer that no existing work
supports due to tremendous efforts required for manual LiRPA implementation.
• We propose loss fusion, a technique that significantly reduces the computational complexity of LiPRA
for certified defense. We demonstrate the first LiPRA-based certified defense training on Tiny ImageNet and
Downscaled ImageNet [4], with a two-magnitude improvement on training efficiency.
• Our framework allows flexible perturbation specifications beyond `p-balls. For example, we demonstrate
a dynamic programming approach to concretize linear bounds under discrete perturbation of synonym-based
word substitution in a sentiment analysis task.
• We showcase that LiRPA can be a valuable tool beyond adversarial robustness, by demonstrating how
to create a neural network with a provably flat optimization landscape and revisit a popular hypothesis on
generalization and the flatness of optimization landscape.
2 Background and Related Work
Giving certified lower and upper bounds for neural networks under input perturbations is the core problem in
robustness verification of neural networks. Early works formulated robustness verification for ReLU networks
as satisfiability modulo theory (SMT) and integer linear programming (ILP) problems [9, 20, 42], which are
hardly feasible even for a MNIST-scale small network. Wong & Kolter [48] proposed to relax the verification
problem with linear programming and investigated its dual solution. Many other works have independently
discovered similar algorithms [7, 30, 37, 46, 52, 39, 45] in either primal or dual space which we refer to as
linear relaxation based perturbation analysis (LiRPA). Recently, Salman et al. [35] unified these algorithms
under the framework of convex relaxation. Among them, CROWN [52] and DeepPoly [39] achieve the tightest
bound for efficient single neuron linear relaxation and are representative algorithms of LiRPA. Several further
refinements for the LiRPA bounding process were also proposed recently, including using an optimizer to
choose better linear bounds [6, 28], relaxing multiple neurons [38] or further tighten convex relaxations [41],
but these methods typically involve much higher computational costs. The contribution of our work is to
extend LiRPA to its most general form, and allow automatic derivation and computation for general network
architectures. Additionally, our framework allows a general purpose perturbation analysis for any nodes in
the graph and flexible perturbation specifications, not limiting to perturbations on input nodes or `p-ball
perturbation specifications. This allows us to use LiRPA as a general tool beyond robustness verification.
The neural network verification problem can also be solved via many other techniques, for example,
semidefinite programming [8, 32], bounding local or global Lipschitz constant [14, 32, 54]. However, LiRPA
based verification methods typically scale much better than alternatives, and they are a keystone for many
state-of-the-art certified defense methods. Certified adversarial defenses typically seek for a guaranteed upper
bound on test error, which can be efficiently obtained using LiRPA bounds. By incorporating the bounds into
the training process (which requires them to be efficient and differentiable), a network can become certifiably
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Table 1: Table of Notations
Symbol Meanings Symbol Meanings
i, j, k Any node on a computational graph xi Value of an independent node, typically model input or parameters.
o Output node on a computational graph hi, hi Lower and upper bound of node i respectively
m(i) In-degree of node i Wi,bi, Wi,bi Parameters of linear lower bounds and upper bounds of node i respectively
u(i) Set of predecessor nodes (inputs) of node i Ai, Ai Linear coefficients of hi(X) terms in the linear lower and upper bounds of ho(X)
S The space of the perturbed input d,d Bias terms in the linear lower and upper bounds of ho(X) during bound propagation
X Concatenation of all xi (assumed flattened) hi(X) Computed value of node i on a computational graph
robust [47, 30, 44, 11, 53]. In addition, while interval bound propagation (IBP) [30, 11] that propagates
constant bounding intervals can be easily extended to general computational graphs, bounds computed by
IBP can be very loose and make stable training challenging [55]. Along with these methods, randomization
based certified defenses have been proposed [5, 27, 26, 34], but in this work we mostly focus on LiRPA based
deterministic certified defense method.
Backpropagation [33] is a classic algorithm to compute the gradients of a complex error function. It can
be applied automatically once the forward computation is defined, without manual derivation of gradients. It
is essential in most deep learning frameworks, such as TensorFlow [1] and PyTorch [31]. The backward bound
propagation in our framework is analogous to backpropagation as our computation is also automatic given the
forward propagation, but we aim to automatically derive bounds for output neurons instead of gradients. Our
algorithm is significantly more complicated. On the other hand, LiRPA based bounds have been implemented
manually in many previous works [48, 52, 44, 29], but they mostly focus on specific types of networks (e.g.,
feedforward or residual networks) for their empirical study, and do not have the flexibility to generalize to
general computational graphs.
3 Algorithm
3.1 Framework of Perturbation Analysis on General computational Graphs
Notations We define a computational graph as a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) G = (V,E). V =
{1, 2, · · · , n} is a set of nodes in G. E is a set of node pairs (i, j) which denotes that node i is an input
argument of node j. For simplicity, we denote the in-degree of node i as m(i), and the set of input nodes for
node i as u(i) = {u1(i), · · · , um(i)(i)} where (uj(i), i) ∈ E, 1 ≤ j ≤ m(i). Each node i has a few associated
attributes: Hi(·) is the associated computation function, hi = Hi(u(i)) is the vector produced by node i.
Although hi can be a tensor in practice, we assume it has been flattened into a vector for simplicity in
this paper. Each node i is either an independent node with m(i) = 0 representing the input nodes of the
graph (e.g., network parameters, model inputs), or a dependent node representing some computations (e.g.,
ReLU, MatMul). For independent nodes, Hi is an identity function and we denote hi=xi. We let X be the
concatenation of all xi, such that the output of each node i can be written as a function of X, hi=hi(X),
without explicitly referring to uj(i). Without losing generality, we assume that the computational graph has a
single output node o. To conduct perturbation analysis, we consider xi to be arbitrarily taken from an input
space Si. In particular, if xi is not perturbed, Si = {ci} and ci is a constant vector. We denote S to be the
space of X when each part of X, xi, is perturbed within Si respectively.
Linear Relaxation based Perturbation Analysis (LiRPA) Our final goal is to compute provable lower
and upper bounds for the value of output node ho(X), i.e., lower bound ho and upper bound ho (element-wise),
when X is perturbed within S: ho ≤ ho(X) ≤ ho, ∀X ∈ S. In LiRPA, we find tight lower and upper bounds
by first computing linear bounds w.r.t. X:
WoX + bo ≤ ho(X) ≤WoX + bo ∀X ∈ S, (1)
where ho(X) is bounded by linear functions of X with parameters Wo,bo,Wo,bo. We generalize existing
LiRPA approaches as two categories: forward mode perturbation analysis and backward mode perturbation
analysis. Both methods aim to obtain bounds (1) in different manners:
• Forward mode: forward mode LiRPA propagates the linear bounds of each node w.r.t. all the
independent nodes, i.e., linear bounds w.r.t. X, to its successor nodes in a forward manner, until reaching the
output node o.
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Algorithm 1 Forward Mode Bound Propagation on General Computational Graphs
function BoundForward(i)
for j ∈ u(i) do
if attributes Wj ,bj ,Wj ,bj of node j are unavailable then
BoundForward(j)
(Wi,bi,Wi,bi) = Gi({Bj |j ∈ u(i)})
• Backward mode: backward mode LiRPA propagates the linear bounds of output node o w.r.t.
dependent nodes to further predecessor nodes in a backward manner, until reaching all the independent nodes.
We describe these two different modes in details below.
Forward Mode LiRPA on General Computation Graphs For each node i on the graph, we compute
the linear bounds of hi(X) w.r.t. all the independent nodes:
WiX + bi ≤ hi(X) ≤WiX + bi ∀X ∈ S.
We start from independent nodes. For an independent node i, we have hi(X)=xi so we trivially have the
bounds Ixi≤hi(X)≤Ixi. For a dependent node i, we have a forward LiRPA oracle function Gi which takes
Wj , bj , Wj , bj for every j ∈u(i) as input and produce new linear bounds for node i, assuming all node
j ∈ u(i) have been bounded:
(Wi,bi,Wi,bi) = Gi({Bj |j ∈ u(i)}),where Bj := (Wj ,bj ,Wj ,bj). (2)
We defer the discussions on oracle function Gi to a later section. Now, we focus on extending this method
on a general graph with known oracle functions in Algorithm 1. The forward mode perturbation analysis is
straightforward to extend to a general computational graph: for each dependent node i, we can obtain its
bounds by recursively applying (2). We check every input node j and compute the bounds of node j if they
are unavailable. We then use Gi to obtain the linear bounds of node i. The correctness of this procedure is
guaranteed by the property of Gi: given Bj as inputs, it always produces valid bounds for node i. We analyze
its complexity in Appendix A.2.
Backward Mode LiRPA on General Computation Graphs For each node i, we maintain two at-
tributes: Ai and Ai, representing the coefficients in the linear bounds of ho(X) w.r.t hi(X):∑
i∈V
Aihi(X) + d ≤ ho(X) ≤
∑
i∈V
Aihi(X) + d ∀X ∈ S, (3)
where d,d are bias terms that are maintained in our algorithm. Suppose that the output dimension of node i
is si, then the shape of matrices Ai and Ai is so×si. Initially, we trivially have
Ao = Ao = I, Ai = Ai = 0(i 6= o), d = d = 0, (4)
which makes (3) hold true. When node i is a dependent node, we have a backward LiRPA oracle function Fi
aiming to compute the lower bound of Aihi(X) and the upper bound of Aihi(X), and represent the bounds
with linear functions of its predecessor nodes u1(i), u2(i), · · · , um(i)(i):
(Λu1(i),Λu1(i),Λu2(i),Λu2(i), · · · ,Λum(i)(i),Λum(i)(i),∆,∆) = Fi(Ai,Ai),
s.t.
∑
j∈u(i) Λjhj(X) + ∆ ≤ Aihi(X), Aihi(X) ≤
∑
j∈u(i) Λjhj(X) + ∆. (5)
We substitute the hi(X) terms in (3) with the new bounds (5), and thereby these terms are backward
propagated to the predecessor nodes and replaced by the hj(X)(j ∈ u(i)) related terms in (5). In the end,
all such terms are propagated to the independent nodes and ho(X) will be bounded by linear functions of
independent nodes only, where (3) becomes equivalent to (1).
We present the full algorithm in Algorithm 2. We let di denote the number of unprocessed output nodes
of node i that node o depends on, which is initially obtained by a “GetOutDegree” function detailed in
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Algorithm 2 Backward Mode Bound Propagation on a General Computational Graph
function BoundBackward(o)
Create BFS queue Q and Q.push(o)
Ao←I, Ao←I, Ai←0, Ai←0 (∀i 6= o), d←0, d←0 (Eq. (4))
GetOutDegree(o) {∀i obtain di, the number of unprocessed output nodes of node i that o depends on.}
while Q is not empty do
i← Q.pop()
(Λu1(i),Λu1(i),Λu2(i),Λu2(i), · · · ,Λum(i)(i),Λum(i)(i),∆,∆) = Fi(Ai,Ai) (Eq. (5))
for j ∈ u(i) do
Aj+= Λj , Aj+= Λj , dj−= 1
if dj = 0 and node j is a dependent node then
Q.push(j)
d+= ∆, d+= ∆, Ai←0, Ai←0 {Clear Ai and Ai once we propagated through i.}
return d, d {The algorithm has modified Ai, Ai on the graph.}
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Figure 1: Illustration of the backward mode perturbation analysis. Node 1 ∼ 5 are independent nodes and
the others are dependent nodes. Red arrows represent the flow of A matrices including both A and A that
are propagated from the final output node (node 14) to previous nodes. Finally, only independent nodes
retain non-zero A matrices (highlighted in red), and these matrices represent linear bounds w.r.t. independent
nodes.
Appendix A.3. We use a BFS for propagating the linear bounds, starting from node o as (4). For each node i
picked from the head of the queue, we backward propagate hi(X) using (5). We update the bound parameters
and decrease all dj(j ∈ u(i)) by one. If dj=0 becomes true for a dependent node j, all its related successor
nodes have been processed and we push node j to the queue. We repeat this process until the queue is empty.
Figure 1 illustrates the flow of backward propagating the bound parameters on an example computational
graph, and Figure 2 illustrates the BFS algorithm. We show its soundness in Theorem 1 and its proof is given
in Appendix B.1.
Theorem 1 (Soundness of backward mode LiRPA). When Algorithm 2 terminates, we have∑
i∈V
Aihi(X) + d ≤ ho(X) ≤
∑
i∈V
Aihi(X) + d ∀X ∈ S,
where Ai, Ai are guaranteed to be 0 for all dependent nodes, and thus we obtain provable linear upper and
lower bounds of node o w.r.t. all independent nodes.
Oracle functions Oracle functions Fi and Gi are defined for each type of operations.1 Previous works [47,
52, 35, 36] have covered many common operations such as affine transformations, activation functions, matrix
1Note that the oracle functions of some operations also require hj ,hj(j ∈ u(i)) for linear relaxation, although we do not
explicitly mention them in the algorithm description for simplicity.
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Figure 2: Flowchart of the BFS in Algorithm 2. In this example, node 6 is the final output node and di is the
number of unprocessed output nodes of node i that node 6 depends on.
multiplication, etc. Since the major focus of this paper is on handling general computational graph structures,
rather than deriving bounds for these elementary operations, we left the detailed form of these oracle functions
in Appendix A.1.
Some oracle functions depend on certain graph attributes. For example, Fi of node i with a nonlinear
operation typically requires hj , hj for all j ∈ u(i) (typically referred to as “pre-activation bounds” in previous
works). We can obtain hj , hj by assuming node j as the output node and apply Algorithm 2, then concretize
the linear bounds as will be discussed in Sec 3.2. However, this can be very expensive because Algorithm 2
needs to be applied for every node j wherever hj or hj is required, rather than just the output node. A
typically more efficient approach is to obtain hj or hj for all dependent nodes except o using a cheaper method
and then apply backward mode LiRPA for node o only. This leads to two variants of hybrid approaches,
Forward+Backward and IBP+Backward, where hj and hj are produced by Foward LiRPA or IBP, respectively.
For certified training, IBP+Backward (generalized from Zhang et al. [55]) is the best for efficiency. We discuss
the time complexity of these methods in Appendix A.2.
3.2 General Perturbation Specifications and Bound Concretization
Once the linear bounds are obtained as (1), concrete bounds ho and ho can be found by solving the following
optimization problems (this step is referred to as the “concretization” of linear bounds):
ho = min
X∈S
WoX + bo, ho = max
X∈S
WoX + bo.
We show two examples: classic `p-ball perturbations, and synonym-based word substitution in language tasks.
`p-ball Perturbations In this setting, assuming that X0 is the clean input, the input space is defined by
S = {X |‖ X−X0 ‖p≤ }, which means that the actual input X is perturbed within an `p-ball centered at
X0 with a radius of . Linear bounds can be concretized as Zhang et al. [52]:
ho = −‖Wo ‖ q+WoX0+bo, ho = ‖Wo ‖ q + WoX0+bo, 1/p+ 1/q = 1,
where ‖ · ‖q denotes taking `q-norm for each row in the matrix and the result makes up a vector.
Synonym-based Word Substitution Beyond `p-ball perturbations, we show an example of a perturbation
specification defined by synonym-based word substitution in language tasks. Let the clean input to the model
be a sequence of words w1, w2, · · · , wl mapped to embeddings e(w1), e(w2), · · · , e(wl). Following a common
adversarial perturbation setting in NLP [17, 19], we allow at most δ words to be replaced and each word wi
can be replaced by words within its pre-defined substitution set S(wi). S(wi) is constructed from the synonyms
of wi and validated with a language model. We denote each actual input word as wˆi ∈ {wi} ∪ S(wi), and we
show that the linear bounds of node k can be concretized with dynamic programming (DP) in Theorem 2 as
proved in Appendix B.2.
Theorem 2. Let W˜t be columns in Wo that correspond to the coefficients of e(wˆt) in the linear bounds. The
lower bound of bo +
∑i
t=1 W˜te(wˆt), when j words among wˆ1, . . . , wˆi have been replaced, denoted as gi,j, can
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be computed by:
g
i,j
= min(g
i−1,j + W˜ie(wi), gi−1,j−1+minw′
{W˜ie(w′)}) (i, j > 0) s.t. w′ ∈ S(wi),
and g
i,0
=bo+
∑i
t=1 W˜te(wt). The concrete lower bound is min
δ
j=0 gn,j . The upper bound can also be computed
similarly by taking the maximum instead of the minimum in the above DP computation.
3.3 Loss Fusion for Scalable Training of Certifiably Robust Neural Networks
The optimization problem of robust training can be formulated as minimizing the robust loss:
min
θ
∑
X0,y
max
X∈S
L(fθ(X), y) (6)
where fθ(X) is the network output at the logit layer, and y is the ground truth. Let gθ(X, y) = (ey1>−I)fθ(X)
be the margin between the ground truth label and all the classes (similarly defined in Wong & Kolter
[48], Zhang et al. [55]). In previous works, the cross-entropy loss is upper bounded by lower bounds on
margins, as a consequence of Theorem 2 in Wong & Kolter [48]: maxX∈S L(fθ(X), y) ≤ L(gθ(X, y), y) where
g
θ
(X, y) ≤ minX∈S gθ(X, y). This requires us to first lower bound gθ(X, y) using LiRPA. The most efficient
LiRPA approach [55] used IBP+backward to obtain this bound, requiring O(Kr) time where K is the output
(logit) layer size (or number of labels), and O(r) is the time complexity of a regular propagation without
computing bounds (see Appendix A.2). This cannot scale to large datasets when K is large (e.g. in Tiny
ImageNet K = 200; in ImageNet K = 1000).
We propose a new technique, loss fusion, which computes an upper bound of L(fθ(X), y) directly without
g
θ
(X, y) as a surrogate. This is possible by treating L as the output node of the computational graph. When
L is the cross entropy loss, we have L(gθ(X), y) = logS(X, y), where S(X, y) =
∑
i≤K exp([−gθ(X, y)]i). We
can thus compute a LiRPA lower bound for S(X, y) directly. This is a novel method that has not appeared
in previous works and it yields two benefits. First, this reduces the time complexity of upper bounding
L(fθ(X), y) to O(r), as now the output layer size has been reduced from K to 1. This is the first time in
literature that a tight LiRPA based bound can be computed in the same asymptotic complexity as forward
propagation and IBP. Second, we show that this is not only faster, but also produces tighter bounds:
Theorem 3. Given concrete lower and upper bounds of gθ(X, y) as gθ(X, y) and gθ(X, y). For S(X, y) =∑
i≤K exp([−gθ(X, y)]i), we have
max
X∈S
L(fθ(X), y) ≤ logS(X, y) ≤ L(−g
θ
(X, y), y), (7)
where L is the cross-entropy loss, S(X, y) is the lower bound of S(X, y) by backward mode LiRPA.
This theorem is proved in Appendix B.3. Intuitively, the original approach of propagating g
θ
(X, y) through
the cross-entropy loss is similar to using IBP for bounding the loss function, but in loss fusion we treat the
loss function as part of the computational graph and apply LiRPA bounds to it directly; it produces tighter
bounds as we can use a tighter relaxation for the nonlinear function S(X, y).
4 Experiments
Table 2: Error rates of different certifiably trained models on CIFAR10 and Tiny-ImageNet datasets (results
on downscaled ImageNet are in Table 4). “Standard”, ‘PGD” and “verified” rows report the standard test
error, test error under PGD attack, and verified test error, respectively.
Dataset Error CNN-7+BN DenseNet WideResNet ResNeXt Literature resultsIBP Ours IBP Ours IBP Ours IBP Ours CROWN-IBP[55] IBP[55]a Balunovic & Vechev [3]
CIFAR10
 = 8255
Standard 57.95% 53.71% 57.21% 56.03% 58.07% 53.89% 56.32% 53.85% 54.02% 58.43% 48.3%
PGD 67.10% 64.31% 67.75% 65.09% 67.23% 64.42% 67.55% 64.16% 65.42% 68.73% -
Verified 69.56% 66.62% 69.59% 67.57% 70.04% 67.77% 70.41% 68.25% 66.94% 70.81% 72.5%
Tiny-ImageNet
 = 1255
Standard 78.54% 78.42% 78.40% 72.96% 73.54% 72.18% 78.94% 78.58% None. [11] reported a IBP model trained on
64× 64 downscaled Imagenet dataset with
84.04% clean error and 93.87% verified error.
PGD 81.05% 80.96% 80.32% 80.52% 79.40% 79.48% 80.17% 79.80%
Verified 87.96% 87.31% 86.87% 85.44% 85.15% 84.14% 87.70% 86.95%
a Gowal et al. [11] reported better IBP verified error (68.44%) but this result was found not easily reproducible [55, 3]
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Table 3: Per-epoch training time and memory usage of the 4 large models on CIFAR10 with batch size
256, and 3 large models on Tiny ImageNet with batch size 100. “LF”=loss fusion; “OOM”=out of memory.
Numbers in parentheses are multiples of natural training time or memory usage. With loss fusion, LiRPA
based bounds are only 3 to 5 times slower than natural training even on datasets with many labels. Without
loss fusion (e.g., in [55]) LiRPA cannot scale to the TinyImageNet dataset.
Dataset Training method Wall clock time (second) GPU Memory Usage (GB)Natural IBP LiRPA w/o LF LiRPA w/ LF Natural IBP LiRPA w/o LF LiRPA w/ LF
CIFAR10
CNN-7+BN 11.89 22.23 (1.87×) 56.05 (4.71×) 33.40 (2.81×) 4.42 7.06 (1.60×) 20.52 (4.64×) 10.34 (2.34×)
DenseNet 22.07 54.40 (2.46×) OOM 90.79 (4.11×) 6.58 16.78 (2.55×) OOM 27.50 (4.18×)
WideResNet 19.39 43.65 (2.55×) OOM 74.78 (3.85×) 7.18 13.50 (1.88×) OOM 21.98 (3.06×)
ResNeXt 14.78 32.44 (2.20×) 132.70 (8.98×) 55.84 (3.78×) 4.74 11.34 (2.39×) 43.68 (9.21×) 18.58 (3.92×)
Tiny-ImageNet
CNN-7+BN 56.70 112.09 (1.98×) OOM 163.29 (2.88×) 4.22 7.12 (1.69×) OOM 10.57 (2.50×)
DenseNet 135.17 318.77 (2.36×) OOM 513.96 (3.80×) 8.55 20.55 (2.4×) OOM 34.81 (4.07×)
WideResNet 133.11 407.74 (3.06×) OOM 635.50 (4.77×) 10.91 24.05 (2.20×) OOM 39.08 (3.58×)
ResNeXt 92.63 191.34 (2.07×) OOM 337.83 (3.65×) 4.31 7.05 (1.64×) OOM 11.66 (2.69×)
Table 4: Certified training on Downscaled ImageNet
dataset. We use WideResNet in this experiment.
Dataset Method Clean PGD Verified
ImageNet (64× 64)
 = 1255
IBP [11] 84.04% 90.88% 93.87%
Ours 83.77% 89.74% 91.27%
Robust Training of Large-scale Vision Models
Our loss fusion technique allows us to scale to Tiny-
ImageNet [25] and downscaled ImageNet [4]; to the
best of our knowledge, this is the first LiRPA based
certified training on Tiny-ImageNet and downscaled
ImageNet with a large number of class labels (200 and
1000, respectively). Besides, the automatic LiRPA
bounds allow us to train certifiably robust models on complicated network architectures (WideResNet [51],
DenseNet [16] and ResNeXt [50]) and achieve state-of-the-art results, where previous works use simpler
models [49, 30, 44, 55] due to implementation difficulty. We extend [55] to the general IBP+backward
approach: we use IBP to compute bounds of intermediate nodes of graph and use tight backward mode LiRPA
for the bounds of last layer. Unlike in CROWN-IBP [55], we apply loss fusion to avoid the time complexity
dependency on the number of class labels, and we train a few state-of-the-art classification models ([55] used
a simple CNN feedforward network). We compare our results to IBP training [11]. We provide detailed
hyperparameters in Appendix C.1. We report results on CIFAR-10 [24] with `∞ perturbation =8/255 and
Tiny-ImageNet with =1/255 in Table 2, and Downscaled-ImageNet [4] which has 1, 000 class labels with
`∞ perturbation =1/255 in Table 4. We find that in all settings, our tight LiRPA bounds improve both
clean and verified error comparing to IBP. Additionally, we achieve state-of-the-art verified error of 66.62% on
CIFAR10 with =8/255, better than latest published works [11, 55, 3] in certified defense.
In Table 3, we report wall clock time and GPU memory usage for regular training, pure IBP training,
LiRPA bounds training on logit layer without loss fusion (same as [55]) and LiRPA bounds training with
loss fusion. We use the same batch size 256 for all settings and conduct the experiments on 4 Nvidia GTX
1080Ti GPUs. With loss fusion, LiRPA is efficient and only 3-4 times slower on both CIFAR10 and Tiny
ImageNet than natural training. With loss fusion, we can enable LiRPA at a cost similar to IBP, allowing us
to use much tighter bounds and obtain better certified error than IBP (Table 2). The cost is significantly
better than [55] which is up to 10 (number of labels) times slower than natural training on CIFAR-10, and
impossible to scale to Tiny ImageNet with 200 labels or downscaled ImageNet with 1000 labels. We also
report an additional comparison where we use the largest possible batch size in each setting in Appendix C.1.
Verifying and Training Robust NLP Models Previous works were only able to implement simple
algorithms such as IBP on simple (e.g. CNN and LSTM) NLP models [19, 17] for certified defense. None of
them can handle complicated models like Transformer [43] or train with tighter LiRPA bounds. We show that
our algorithm can train certifiably robust models for LSTM and Transfomrer sentiment classifier on SST-2 [40].
We consider synonym-based word substitution with δ≤ 6 (up to 6 word substitutions). We provide more
backgrounds and training details in Appendix C.2. In Table 5, we first verify normally trained (δtrain =0)
LSTM and Transformer. Unfortunately, most configurations cannot yield a non-trivial verified accuracy (larger
than 1%), except for the case of using the forward mode perturbation analysis on a Transformer. We then
conduct certified training with δtrain={1, 6} using IBP and the efficient IBP+Backward perturbation analysis.
Models trained using IBP+Backward outperforms pure IBP, and the verified test accuracy is significantly
better than naturally trained models. The results demonstrate that our framework allows us to better verify
and train complex NLP models using tight LiRPA bounds.
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Table 5: Verification and certified training for NLP models. δtrain and δ represent the number of perturbed
synonym words during training and evaluation. For the most important setting δtrain=6, we run training
with 5 different seeds and report the mean and standard deviation. δtrain=0 stands for natural training (no
robust objective); δ = 0 stands for evaluating clean (standard) test accuracy. “IBP+Backward (alt.)” on
δtrain=1 has an alternative training schedule focusing on the small δ (see Appendix C.2).
Model Training Verified Test Accuracy (%)Budget Method δ = 0 δ = 1 δ = 2 δ = 3 δ = 4 δ = 5 δ = 6
LSTM
δtrain = 0
IBP 84.9 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Forward 84.9 0 0 0 0 0 0
Forward+Backward 84.9 0 0 0 0 0 0
δtrain = 1
IBP 81.3 78.2 78.2 78.2 78.2 78.2 78.2
IBP+Backward (alt.) 81.7 77.3 75.2 73.8 72.7 72.3 72.0
IBP+Backward 81.3 79.0 78.6 78.6 78.6 78.6 78.6
δtrain = 6
IBP 79.8±1.09 76.2±1.67 76.2±1.67 76.2±1.67 76.2±1.67 76.2±1.67 76.2±1.67
IBP+Backward 79.4±1.47 76.6±1.42 76.6±1.42 76.6±1.42 76.6±1.42 76.6±1.42 76.6±1.42
Transformer
δtrain = 0
IBP 82.0 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Forward 82.0 60.6 47.1 40.5 36.8 35.6 35.0
Forward+Backward 82.0 65.0 51.2 44.5 41.3 39.2 38.7
δtrain = 1
IBP 78.7 76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9
IBP+Backward (alt.) 79.2 77.0 75.4 75.1 74.5 74.1 73.9
IBP+Backward 78.5 77.3 77.2 77.1 77.1 77.1 77.1
δtrain = 6
IBP 78.4±0.34 76.6±0.30 76.6±0.30 76.6±0.30 76.6±0.30 76.6±0.30 76.6±0.30
IBP+Backward 78.5±0.08 77.4±0.21 77.4±0.19 77.4±0.19 77.4±0.20 77.4±0.20 77.4±0.19
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Figure 3: Application of applying LiRPA bounds to network parameters to obtain a model with a provably
“flat” loss surface. (a) Test accuracy of naturally trained models and “flat” objective trained models on MNIST
and FashionMNIST with different combinations of data size and batch size. (b) The training loss landscape of
models trained with nature and flat objective on 10% data of MNIST with 0.1N batch size. We plot the loss
surface along the gradient direction and a random direction.
Training Neural Networks with Guaranteed Flatness Recently, some researchers [13, 18, 12, 15] have
hypothesized that DNNs optimized with stochastic gradient descent (SGD) can find wide and flat local minima
which may be associated with good generalization performance.
Unlike most previous works that only consider input perturbations, our framework naturally extends
perturbation analysis on network parameters θ as they are also independent nodes in a computational graph
(e.g., node x2 in Figure 2). With this advantage, LiRPA can compute provable upper and lower bounds on
the local “flatness” around a certain point θ0 for some loss L:
L(θ0)− CL(θ0) ≤ L(θ0 + ∆θ) ≤ L(θ0) + CU (θ0), for all ‖∆θ‖2 ≤ , (8)
where CL and CU are linear functions of θ0 that can be found using our algorithm. This is a “zeroth order”
flatness criterion, where we guarantee that the loss value does not change too much in a small region around
θ0, and we do not have further assumptions on gradients or Hessian of the loss. When θ0 is a good solution,
L(θ0) is close to 0, so we can simply set the left hand side of (8) to 0 and upper bound L(θ0 + ∆θ). Using our
framework, we can train a classifier that guarantees flatness of local optimization landscape, by minimizing the
“flat” objective L(θ0)+CU (θ0) for the perturbation set S(θ)={θ :‖θ−θ0‖2 ≤ } where θ0 is the current network
parameter. When this “flat” objective is close to 0, we guarantee that L is close to 0 for all θ ∈ S(θ). We build
a three-layer MLP model with [64, 64, 10] neurons in each layer and conduct experiments using only 10% and
1% of the training data in MNIST and FashionMNIST, and we then test on the full test set to aggressively
evaluate the generalization performance. We also aggressively set the batch size to {0.01N, 0.1N,N} as in [18]
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where N is the size of training dataset. Additional details can be found in Appendix C.3.
The test accuracies of the models trained with regular cross entropy and our “flat” objective are shown in
Figure 3a. We visualize their loss surfaces in Figure 3b. When batch size is increased or less data are used,
test accuracy generally decreases due to overfitting, which is consistent with [21]. For models trained with
the flat objective, the accuracy tends to be better, especially when a very large batch size is used. These
observations provide some evidence for the hypothesis that a flat local minimum generalizes better, however
we cannot exclude the possibility that the improvements come from side effects our objective. Our focus is to
demonstrate potential applications beyond neural network verification of our framework rather than proving
this hypothesis.
5 Conclusions
Linear Relaxation based Perturbation Analysis (LiRPA) was originally developed for robustness verification
of neural networks to provide provable output bounds. Existing efforts on this field are largely fragmented
and researchers typically need to build the bounds on their own to adapt LiRPA based techniques to a new
architecture [57, 23, 36]. Additionally, the lack of a general and easy-to-use tool and the relatively cumbersome
bound derivation process prevent the application of LiRPA for general machine learning audience and the
industry. Our work generalizes LiRPA based algorithms to its most general form for general computational
graphs, and our framework allows automatic and differentiable bound computation which enables LiRPA as a
toolbox for machine learning researchers and practitioners who are not experts on verification. When used for
certified defense training, our framework enables the loss fusion technique which significantly reduces time
complexity of existing similar approaches, and outperforms previous works on large datasets like downscaled
ImageNet. We also demonstrate potential usage of LiRPA beyond verification and certified defense. The
generality, flexibility, efficiency and ease-of-use of our proposed framework facilitate the adoption of LiRPA
based provable methods for other machine learning problems beyond robustness verification.
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In Appendix A, we provide more discussions on LiRPA bounds, including detailed algorithm and complexity
analysis, comparison of different LiRPA implementations, and also a small numerical example in Appendix A.4.
In Appendix B, we provide proofs of the theorems. We provide additional experiments, including more
LiRPA trained TinyImageNet models and IBP baselines in Appendix C.1, and we also provide details for
each experiment in Appendix C.
A Additional Discussions on LiRPA Bounds
A.1 Oracle functions and linear relaxations of compute functions
In this section, we summarize some examples of oracle functions as derived in previous works [52, 45, 36]. In
Table 6, we provide a list of oracle functions of three basic operation types, including affine transformation,
unary nonlinear function, and binary nonlinear function. Most common operations involved in neural networks
can be addressed following these basic operation types. For example, dense layers and convolutional layers
are affine transformations, activation functions are unary nonlinear functions, multiplication and division
are binary nonlinear functions, and matrix multiplication or dot product of two variable matrices can be
considered as multiplications with an affine transformation.
The α, β, γ, α, β, γ parameters in the table are parameters for linearly relaxing the corresponding nonlinear
function. For example, for ReLU, σ(hj(X)) = max(hj(X), 0), is a piecewise linear function and can be
linearly relaxed w.r.t. the bounds of hj(X), denoted as l ≤ hj(X) ≤ u. When u ≤ 0 or l ≥ 0, σ(hj(X))
is a linear function on hj(X) ∈ [l, u], and thus σ(hj(X)) = hj(X) is a linear function, i.e., we can take
α = α = 1, β = β = 0. Otherwise, l < 0 < u, we can take the line (l, σ(l)) and (u, σ(u)) as the linear upper
bound, i.e., α = σ(u)−σ(l)u−l , β = −αl. For the lower bound, Zhang et al. [52] proposed to adaptively select
α = I(u > |l|) to minimize the relaxation error, and β = −αl. Alternatively, we can also select α = 0, and
thereby the linear relaxation can be provably tighter than IBP bounds, as illustrated in Figure 4. We can use
this alternative lower bound for training ReLU networks with loss fusion.
4 2 0 2 4
1
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5
ReLU
Linear bounds
IBP bounds
Figure 4: An example of ReLU relaxation when l = −1.5, u = 1.5. We always take 0 as the lower bound and
take the blue dashed line as the linear upper bound. In contrast, IBP takes the red dashed lines as the lower
and upper bounds respectively, which is a looser relaxation.
The detailed derivation of the oracle functions shown in Table 6 has been covered in previous works [52,
45, 36] and is not a focus of this paper. We refer readers to those existing works for details.
A.2 Complexity Comparison between Different Perturbation Analysis Modes
In this section, we compare the computational cost of different perturbation analysis modes. We assume that
Dx and Dy are the total dimension of the perturbed independent nodes and the final output node respectively.
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Table 6: A list of common types of operations, their definition Hi, and their corresponding oracle functions
Fi and Gi. Subscript “+” stands for taking positive elements from the matrix or vector while setting other
elements to zero, and vice versa for subscript “-”. diag(·) stands for constructing a diagonal matrix from
a vector. α, β, γ, α, β, γ are parameters of linear relaxation that can be derived for each specific nonlinear
function.
Operation Type Functions
Affine transformation
Hi hi(X) = Wˆihj(X) + bˆi
Fi
Λj = AiWˆi
Λj = AiWˆi
∆ = Aibˆi
∆ = Aibˆi
Gi
Wi = Wˆi,+Wj + Wˆi,−Wj
bi = Wˆi,+bj + Wˆi,−bj + bˆi,
Wi = Wˆi,+Wj + Wˆi,−Wj
bi = Wˆi,+bj + Wˆi,−bj + bˆi,
Unary Nonlinear Function
Hi hi(X) = σ(hj(X))
Fi
Λj = Ai,+diag(α) + Ai,+diag(α)
Λj = Ai,+diag(α) + Ai,+diag(α)
∆ = Ai,+β + Ai,−β
∆ = Ai,+β + Ai,−β
Gi
Wi = diag+(α)Wj + diag−(α)Wj
bi = diag+(α)bj + diag−(α)bj + β
Wi = diag+(α)Wj + diag−(α)Wj
bi = diag+(α)bj + diag−(α)bj + β
where αhj(X) + β ≤ hi(X) ≤ αhj(X) + β
Binary Nonlinear Function
Hi hi(X) = pi(hj(X), hk(X))
Fi
Λj = Ai,+diag(α) + Ai,+diag(α)
Λj = Ai,+diag(α) + Ai,+diag(α)
Λk = Ai,+diag(β) + Ai,+diag(β)
Λk = Ai,+diag(β) + Ai,+diag(β)
∆ = Ai,+γ + Ai,−γ
∆ = Ai,+γ + Ai,−γ
Gi
Wi = diag+(α)Wj + diag−(α)Wj + diag+(β)Wk + diag−(β)Wk
bi = diag+(α)bj + diag−(α)bj + β + diag+(β)bk + diag−(β)bk + γ
Wi = diag+(α)Wj + diag−(α)Wj + diag+(β)Wk + diag−(β)Wk
bi = diag+(α)bj + diag−(α)bj + β + diag+(β)bk + diag−(β)bk + γ
where αhj(X) + βhk(X) + γ ≤ hi(X) ≤ αhj(X) + βhk(X) + γ
We focus on a usual case in classification models, where the final output node is a logits layer whose dimension
equals to the number of classes and thus usually Dy  Dx holds true, or the final output is a loss function
with Dy = 1 Dx if loss fusion is enabled. We also assume that the time complexity of a regular forward
pass of the computational graph (e.g., a regular inference pass) is O(r), and the complexity of a regular back
propagation pass in gradient computation is also asymptotically O(r). Note that the overall time complexity
of LiRPA depends on oracle functions, and in the below analysis we focus on common cases (e.g., common
activation functions in Table 6).
Interval bound propagation (IBP) IBP can be seen as a special and degenerated case of LiRPA bounds.
The time complexity of pure IBP is still O(r) since it computes two output values, a lower bound and a upper
bound, for each neuron, and thus the time complexity is the same as a regular forward pass which computes
one output value for each neuron. However, pure IBP cannot give tight enough bounds especially for models
without certifiably robust training.
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Backward mode bound propagation Backward mode LiRPA oracles typically require bounds of inter-
mediate nodes hj , hj for all j ∈ u(i) for a node i (referred to as “pre-activation bounds” in some works).
Assuming these intermediate bounds are known; in this case, the oracle function Fi typically has the same
time complexity as back propagation of gradients through node i (e.g., for linear layers it is the transposed
operation of Hi(·)). However, unlike in back propagation where the gradients is computed for a scalar function,
in backward mode LiRPA we need to compute O(Dy) values for each neuron, and these values stand for the
coefficients of the linear bounds of the Dy final output neurons. The time complexity is roughly Dy times
back propagation time, O(Dyr).
For a purely backward perturbation analysis that can be extended from CROWN [52], the bounds of
intermediate nodes needed for the oracle functions are also computed with a backward mode LiRPA. Assuming
there are N nodes in total (including output nodes and all intermediate nodes) that require LiRPA bounds,
the total time complexity is asymptotically O(Nr) where N can be a quite large number (e.g., for feed-forward
ReLU networks N includes hidden neurons over all layers and N  Dy), so this approach cannot scale to
large graphs or be used for efficient training.
Forward mode bound propagation In the forward mode perturbation analysis, since we represent the
bounds of each neuron with linear functions w.r.t. the perturbed independent nodes, we need to compute
O(Dx) values for each neuron. Usually, the oracle functions Gi has the same asymptotic complexity as the
computation function Hi(·); however, the inputs of Gi include dimension Dx, and the total time complexity of
is roughly O(Dxr). Note that in the implementation of the forward mode, we do not compute linear functions
w.r.t. all the independent nodes, but we only need to consider those perturbed independent nodes while
treating the other independent nodes as constants, and thereby Dx may be much smaller than the dimension
of X, e.g., model parameters can be excluded if they are not perturbed.
Efficient hybrid bounds Among the LiRPA variants, IBP+Backward with a complexity of O(Dyr) is
usually most efficient for classification models and is used in our certified training experiments. When loss
fusion is enabled, Dy = 1 during training, and thereby the complexity of IBP+Backward is O(r), which is the
same as that of IBP. In this way, our loss fusion technique can significantly improve the scalability of certified
training with LiRPA bounds. To obtain tighter bounds for intermediate nodes which can also tighten the final
output bounds, we may use pure forward or Forward+Backward mode with a complexity of O(Dxr) which is
usually larger than that of IBP+Backward when Dy  Dx. The forward mode LiRPA can be potentially
useful for situations where Dx  Dy, e.g., for generative models with a large output dimension. We leave this
as our future work.
A.3 The GetOutDegree Auxiliary Function in Backward Mode Perturbation
Analysis
Algorithm 3 Auxiliary Function for Computing Output Degrees
function GetOutDegree (o)
Create BFS queue and Q.push(o)
di ← 0 (∀i ≤ n)
while Q is not empty do
i = Q.pop()
for j ∈ u(i) do
dj+= 1
if j has not been in Q then
Q.push(j)
As mentioned in Section 3.4, we have an auxiliary “GetOutDegree” function for computing the degree di
of each node i, which is defined as the the number of outputs nodes of node i that the node o is dependent on.
This function is illustrated in Algorithm 3. We use a BFS pass. At the beginning, node o is added into the
queue. Next, each time we pick a node i from the head of the queue. Node o is dependent on node i, and
thus we increase the degree of its input nodes, each dj(j ∈ u(i)), by 1. Node o is also dependent on node
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j(j ∈ u(i)) and we add node j to the queue if it has never been in the queue yet. We repeat this process until
the queue becomes empty, and at this time any node i that node o is dependent on has been visited and has
contributed to the dj(j ∈ u(i)) of its input nodes.
A.4 A Small Example of LiRPA Bounds
Here we provide a small example to illustrate the computation of our LiRPA methods. We assume that we
have a simple ReLU network with 2 hidden layers, with weight matrix of each layer as below:
Wˆ1 = [[2, 1], [−3, 4]], Wˆ2 = [[4,−2], [2, 1]], Wˆ3 = [−2, 1],
and we do not consider bias attributes of the layers.
Given a clean input X0 = [[0], [1]] and `∞ perturbation  = 2, we can compute the bounds of the last layer
and compare the results from IBP, forward mode LiRPA and backward mode LiRPA.
IBP
h1 = [[2], [3]],
h1 = [[−2], [−1]],
h2 = Wˆ1,+h1 + Wˆ1,−h1 = [[7], [12]] + [[0], [6]] = [[7], [18]],
h2 = Wˆ1,+h1 + Wˆ1,−h1 = [[−5], [−4]] + [[0], [−6]] = [[−5], [−10]],
h3 = Wˆ2,+h2 + Wˆ2,−h2 = [[28], [32]] + [[0], [0]] = [[28], [32]],
h3 = Wˆ2,+h2 + Wˆ2,−h2 = [[0], [0]] + [[−36], [0]] = [[−36], [0]],
h4 = Wˆ3,+h3 + Wˆ3,−h3 = [32] + [0] = [32],
h4 = Wˆ3,+h3 + Wˆ3,−h3 = [0] + [−56] = [−56].
In the following computation of LiRPA bounds, we always use zero as the lower bound of ReLU activation,
as visualized in Figure 4.
Forward Mode LiRPA
W1 = W1 = I, b1 = b1 = 0,
W2 = W2 = Wˆ1 = [[2, 1], [−3, 4]],
h2 = 2[[3], [7]] + [[1], [4]] = [[7], [18]],
h2 = −2[[3], [7]] + [[1], [4]] = [[−5], [−10]].
We compute the relaxation of the first layer ReLU activations.
diag(α1) = [[0.58, 0], [0, 0.64]], diag(α1) = [[0, 0], [0, 0]],
β1 = [[2.92], [6.43]]], β1 = [[0], [0]],
W3 = Wˆ2,+(diag(α1)W2) + Wˆ2,−(diag(α1)W2) = [[4.67, 2.33], [0.40, 3.74]],
W3 = Wˆ2,−(diag(α1)W2) + Wˆ2,+(diag(α1)W2) = [[3.86,−5.14], [0, 0]],
d2 = Wˆ2,+β1 + Wˆ2,−β1 = [[11.67], [12.26]], d2 = Wˆ2,−β1 + Wˆ2,+β1 = [[−12.86], [0]],
h3 = [[28], [24]], h3 = [[−36], [0]].
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We then repeat the computation on the second layer.
diag(α2) = [[0.4375, 0], [0, 1]], diag(α2) = [[0, 0], [0, 1], ]
β2 = [[15.75], [0]], β2 = [[0], [0]],
W4 = Wˆ3,+(diag(α2)W3) + Wˆ3,−(diag(α2)W3) = [0.40, 3.74],
W4 = Wˆ3,−(diag(α2)W3) + Wˆ3,+(diag(α2)W3) = [−4.08,−2.04],
d3 = Wˆ3,+(β2 + diag(α2)β2) + Wˆ3,−(β2 + diag(α2)β2) = [12.26],
d3 = Wˆ3,−(β2 + diag(α2)β2) + Wˆ3,+(β2 + diag(α2)β2) = [−41.71],
h4 = [24.29], h4 = [−56].
Backward mode LiRPA Here we reuse the intermediate results from forward mode LiRPA to decide the
status of ReLU activations, and the linear relaxation of ReLU activations is the same as forward mode LiRPA
results, where
diag(α1) = [[0.58, 0], [0, 0.64]], diag(α1) = [[0, 0], [0, 0]],
β1 = [[2.92], [6.43]]], β1 = [[0], [0]],
diag(α2) = [[0.4375, 0], [0, 1]], diag(α2) = [[0, 0], [0, 1]]
β2 = [[15.75], [0]], β2 = [[0], [0]].
We then compute the linear bounds from the last layer to the first layer and finally concretize the linear
bounds.
A4 = A4 = I,
A3 = A4Wˆ3 = [−2, 1],
A3 = A4Wˆ3 = [−2, 1],
A2 = A3,+diag(α2)Wˆ2 + A3,−diag(α2)Wˆ2 = [2, 1],
A2 = A3,+diag(α2)Wˆ2 + A3,−diag(α2)Wˆ2 = [−1.5, 2.75],
A1 = A2,+diag(α1)Wˆ1 + A2,−diag(α1)Wˆ1 = [0.40, 3.74],
A1 = A2,+diag(α1)Wˆ1 + A2,−diag(α1)Wˆ1 = [−1.75,−0.875],
d1 = A2,+β2 + A2,−β2 + A1,+β1 + A1,−β1 = [12.26],
d1 = A2,+β2 + A2,−β2 + A1,+β1 + A1,−β1 = [−35.875],
h4 = [24.28], h4 = [−42].
As we can see from this simple example, we can get the tightest bounds from backward LiRPA compared
to IBP and forward LiRPA, even we reuse the intermediate results from forward LiRPA instead of concretizing
the bounds from the backward mode layer by layer.
A.5 Existing LiRPA implementations
We list and compare a few notable LiRPA implementations in Table 7.
B Proofs of the Theorems
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
In Theorem 1, we bound node o with:∑
i∈V
Aihi(X) + d ≤ ho(X) ≤
∑
i∈V
Aihi(X) + d ∀X ∈ S. (9)
18
Table 7: Comparison between different implementations for perturbation analysis. (“FF” = FeedForward
network)
Method Based On Mode Structure Activation Perturbation Differentiability Automatica Efficiency Tightness
DiffAI [30] PyTorch Backward, IBP FF+ResNet ReLU `∞ Yes No GPU ++
IBP [11, 30] TensorFlow IBP General General `∞ Yes No GPU -
ERAN [29] C++/CUDAb Backward, IBP, othersc General General `p+semantic No No Partially GPU ++
Convex-Adv [48] PyTorch Backward FF+ResNet ReLU `p Yes No Multi-GPU +
Fast-Lin [46] Numpy Backward FF (MLP) ReLU `p No No CPU +
CROWN [52] Numpy Backward FF (MLP) General `p No No CPU ++
CROWN-IBP [52] PyTorch Backward, IBP FF General `p Yes No Multi-GPU ++
Ours PyTorch Backward, Forward, IBP General General Generald Yes Yes Multi-GPU ++
a “Automatic” is defined as an user can easily obtain bounds using existing model source code, without manual conversion or implementation.
b ERAN has a TensorFlow frontend to read TensorFlow models, but its backend is written in C++ and partially CUDA.
c Other types of bounds like k-ReLU [38] are provided, but typically much less efficient than IBP or backward mode perturbation analysis.
d User supplied perturbation specifications.
Initially, this inequality holds true with
Ao = Ao = I, Ai = Ai = 0(i 6= o), d = d = 0, (10)
because then ∑
i∈V
Aihi(X) + d =
∑
i∈V
Aihi(X) + d = ho(X)
meets (9).
Without loss of generality, we assume that the nodes are numbered in topological order, i.e., for each
node i and its input node j ∈ u(i), i > j holds true, and we assume that there are n′ independent nodes.
Then, o = n and all the independent nodes have the smallest numbers. This can be achieved via a topological
sort for any computational graph. We can also ignore nodes that node o does not depend on. With these
assumptions, we show a lemma:
Lemma 4. In Algorithm 2, every dependent node i(i > n′) will be visited once and only once. And when
node i is visited, all nodes that depend on node i must have been visited.
Proof. First, node o is added to the queue and will be visited, and since it has no successor node, it will not
be added to the queue again during the BFS. We assume that node i . . . n will be visited once and only once,
and this is initially true with i = o = n. For i− 1 > n′, we show that node (i− 1) will also be visited once
and only once. When node i . . . n have all been visited, the successor nodes of node (i− 1) have been visited
and di−1 = 0, and node (i− 1) is a dependent node. Therefore, node (i− 1) will be added to the queue and
visited. From the assumption on node i . . . n, all nodes that depend on the successor nodes of node (i− 1)
have also been visited. Nodes that depend on node (i− 1) consist of the successor nodes of node (i− 1) and
nodes that depend on these successors, and thus they have all been visited. Since node i . . . n will not be
visited more than once, node (i− 1) will not be added to the queue by its successor nodes more than once.
Therefore, node (i− 1) will also be visited once and only once. Using mathematical induction, we can prove
that the lemma holds true for all node i(i > n′).
According to Lemma 4, every dependent node i is visited once and exactly once. When node i is visited,
its Ai and Ai are propagated to its input nodes and set to 0 after that. At this time, all successor nodes of
node i have been visited and will not been visited again. Therefore, Ai and Ai will keep to be 0 after node i
is visited. Therefore, when Algorithm 2 terminates, Ai,Ai of all dependent node i will be 0, and thereby we
will obtain linear bounds of node o w.r.t. all the independent nodes.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 shows that linear bounds under perturbation defined by synonym-based word substitution can be
concretized with a dynamic programming. Specifically, to concretize a linear lower bound, we need to compute
ho = min
wˆ1,wˆ2,...,wˆn
bo +
n∑
t=1
W˜te(wˆt) s.t.
n∑
t=1
I(wˆt 6= wt) ≤ δ, (11)
where e(wˆt) is embedding of the t-th word in the input, W˜t are columns in Wo corresponding to the coefficients
of e(wˆt) in the linear bound. In the dynamic programming, we compute gi,j(j ≤ i) that denotes the lower
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bound of bo +
∑i
t=1 W˜te(wˆt) when j words among the first i words wˆ1, . . . , wˆi have been replaced. If wˆk has
not been replaced, wˆk = wk, otherwise wˆk ∈ S(wk).
For i = 0, obviously g
0,0
= bo. For j = 0, wˆ1, wˆ2, · · · , wˆi must have not been replaced and thus
wˆt = wt(1 ≤ t ≤ i) holds true. Therefore, gi,0 = bo +
∑i
t=1 W˜te(wt). For i, j > 0, we consider whether wˆi
has been replaced. If wˆi has not been replaced, W˜ie(wˆi) = W˜ie(wi), and j words have been replaced among
the first i− 1 words. In this case, bo +
∑i
t=1 W˜te(wˆt) = bo +
∑i−1
t=1 W˜te(wˆt) + W˜ie(wi) ≥ gi−1,j + W˜ie(wi).
For the other case if wˆi has been replaced, j − 1 words have been replaced among the first i− 1 words, and
bo +
∑i
t=1 W˜te(wˆt) ≥ gi−1,j−1 + minw′{W˜ie(w′)}, where w′ ∈ S(wi). We combine these two cases and take
the minimum of their results, and thus:
g
i,j
= min(g
i−1,j + W˜ie(wi), gi−1,j−1+minw′{W˜ie(w′)}) (i, j > 0) s.t. w′ ∈ S(wi).
The result of (11) is minδj=0 gn,j . The upper bounds can also be computed in a similar way simply by changing
from taking the minimum to taking the maximum in the above derivation.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 3
In Theorem 3, we show that given concrete lower and upper bounds of gθ(X, y) as gθ(X, y) and gθ(X, y),
with S(X, y)=
∑
i≤K exp(−[gθ(X, y)]i), we have
max
X∈S
L(fθ(X), y) ≤ logS(X, y) ≤ L(−gθ(X, y), y), (12)
where S(X, y) is the upper bound of S(X, y) from the backward mode LiRPA.
L(fθ(X), y) is the cross entropy loss with softmax normalization, and
L(fθ(X), y) = − log [exp(fθ(X))]y∑
i≤K [exp(fθ(X))]i
= log
∑
i≤K
exp([fθ(X)]i − [fθ(X)]y)
= log
∑
i≤K
exp(−[gθ(X, y)]i)
= logS(X, y).
Since log is a monotonic function,
max
X∈S
L(fθ(X), y) = log max
X∈S
S(X, y) ≤ logS(X, y).
On the other hand, since [gθ(X, y)]y = 0,
L(−gθ(X, y), y) = − log 1∑
i≤K exp(−[gθ(X, y)]i)
= log
∑
i≤K
exp(−[gθ(X, y)]i).
And L(−g
θ
(X, y), y) is an upper bound of maxX∈S L(fθ(X), y), since
max
X∈S
L(fθ(X), y) ≤ log
∑
i≤K
exp(−min
X∈S
[gθ(X, y)]i) ≤ log
∑
i≤K
exp(−[g
θ
(X, y)]i) = L(−gθ(X, y), y).
We then show that logS(X, y) ≤ L(−g
θ
(X, y), y), i.e., S(X, y) ≤ ∑i≤K exp(−[gθ(X, y)]i). Computing∑
i≤K exp(−[gθ(X, y)]i) is essentially propagating gθ(X, y) through exp and summation in the loss function
using IBP, while S(X, y) is directly computed from the LiRPA bound of S(X, y). Computing S(X, y) and∑
i≤K exp(−[gθ(X, y)]i) can be unified as computing the upper bound of A˜ exp(−gθ(X, y)) using LiRPA with
different relaxations for exp, where A˜ is a matrix of ones with size 1×K. For S(X, y), the relaxation for the
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Figure 5: Illustration of different upper bounds of exp(x) within x ∈ [−1.5, 1.5]. The linear bound (blue line)
is a tighter bound than the IBP bound (red line). The blue area stands for the gap between the two upper
bounds. Note that for this particular setting of upper bounding S(X, y) we only need upper bounds for this
non-linear function.
upper bound of exp(x)(l ≤ x ≤ u) is a line passing (l, el) and (u, eu), while it is exp(x) ≤ eu when computing∑
i≤K exp(−[gθ(X, y)]i). We illustrate the two different relaxations in Figure 5. Therefore, the relaxation on
exp in S(X, y) is strictly tighter when l < u. After relaxing exp, both ways can be seen as computing the the
upper bound of Aˆgθ(X, y) + dˆ with LiRPA, where Aˆ and dˆ are obtained by merging A˜ and the relaxation on
exp. Note that when the relaxation exp(x) ≤ eu is used, since the relaxed function has no linear term, Aˆ = 0,
and in this case the result will simply be dˆ. While computing the upper bound of Aˆgθ(X, y) + dˆ can be unified
under the LiRPA framework, the difference of the two ways is on the exp relaxation. Since the exp relaxation
for S(X, y) is no looser than that for
∑
i≤K exp(−[gθ(X, y)]i), we can have S(X, y) ≤
∑
i≤K exp(−[gθ(X, y)]i)
(the relaxation area is strictly smaller), and thereby logS(X, y) ≤ L(−g
θ
(X, y), y).
C Additional Details on Experiments
C.1 Details on Training Large-scale Certified Defenses
Training parameters In order to perform fair comparable experiments, for all experiments on large scale
vision models training (Table 2 and 4), we use same setting for CROWN-IBP and IBP. Across all datasets, the
networks were trained using the Adam [22] optimizer with an initial learning rate of 5× 10−4. Also, gradient
clipping with a maximum `2 norm of 8 is applied. We gradually increase  within a fixed length (800 epochs
for CIFAR10, 400 epochs for Tiny-ImageNet and 80 epochs for Downscaled-ImageNet). We uniformly cut the
fixed length by a factor 0.4, and exponential increase  during the former interval and linear increase  during
the latter interval so that avoid a sudden growth of  at the beginning stage. Follow [55], for CROWN-IBP
training, one more hyperparameter β (the weight between CROWN-IBP bound and IBP bound) is set from 1
to 0 according to the difference between the current  and target . The target  is set as 10% higher than the
desired robustness radius. All models are trained on 4 Nvidia GTX 1080TI GPUs (44GB GPU memory in
total).
• CIFAR10  = 8255 . We train 2,000 epochs with batch size 256 in total, the first 200 epochs are clean
training, then we gradually increase  per batch with a  schedule length of 800, finally we conduct 1,100
epochs pure IBP training. We decay the learning rate by 10× at 1,400 and 1,700 epoch respectively.
During training, we add random flips and crops, and normalize each image channel (using the channel
statistics from the training set).
• Tiny-ImageNet  = 1255 . We train 800 epochs with batch size 110 in total, the first 100 epochs are
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clean training, then we gradually increase  per batch with a  schedule length of 400, finally we conduct
500 epochs pure IBP training. We decay the learning rate by 10× at 600 and 700 epoch respectively.
During training, we use random crops of 56 × 56 and random flips. During testing, we use a central 56
× 56 crop. We also normalize each image channel (using the channel statistics from the training set).
• Downscaled-ImageNet  = 1255 . We train 240 epochs with batch size 110 in total, the first 100
epochs are clean training, then we gradually increase  per batch with a  schedule length of 80, finally
we conduct 60 epochs pure IBP training. We decay the learning rate by 10× at 200 and 220 epoch
respectively. During training, we use random crops of 56 × 56 and random flips. During testing, we use
a central 56 × 56 crop. We also normalize each image channel (using the channel statistics from the
training set).
All verified error numbers are evaluated on the testing set using IBP by  = 8255 for CIFAR10 and  =
1
255 for
Tiny-ImageNet and Downscaled-ImageNet.
Model Structures The details of vision model structures we used are described bellow (note that we omit
the final linear layer which has 10 neurons for CIFAR10 and 200 neurons for Tiny-ImageNet):
• CNN-7+BN 5× Conv-BN-ReLU layers with {64, 64, 128, 128, 128} filters respectively, and a linear
layer with 512 neurons.
• DenseNet {2, 4, 4} Dense blocks with growth rate 32 and a linear layer with 512 neurons.
• WideResNet 3× Wide basic blocks (6× Conv-ReLU-BN layers) with widen factor = 4 for CIFAR10,
widen factor = 10 for Tiny-ImageNet and Downscaled-ImageNet. An additional linear layer with 512
neurons is added for CIFAR10.
• ResNeXt {1, 1, 1} blocks for CIFAR10 and {2, 2, 2} blocks for Tiny-ImageNet and cardinality = 2,
bottleneck width = 32 and a linear layer with 512 neurons.
It worth to mention that both [55] and [56] are conducted experiments on expensive 32 TPU cores which
has up to 512 GB TPU memory in total. In comparison, our framework with loss fusion can be quite efficient
working on 44 GB GPU memory.
Moreover, the running time with maximum batch size on 4 Nvidia GTX 1080TI GPUs of all models on
two datasets is performed in Table 8. Note that large scale models cannot training by CROWN-IBP without
loss fusion even the mini-batch on each GPU is only 1 for DenseNet and WideResNet.
Table 8: Per-epoch training time and memory usage of the 4 large models on CIFAR10 and Tiny-ImageNet
with maximum batch size for 4 Nvidia GTX 1080TI GPUs. “LF”=loss fusion. “OOM”= out of memory.
Numbers in parentheses are relative to natural training time.
Data Training method Wall clock time (second) Maximum batch sizeNatural IBP LiRPA w/o LF LiRPA w/ LF Natural IBP LiRPA w/o LF LiRPA w/ LF
CIFAR10
CNN-7+BN 7.59 11.17 (1.54×) 46.52 (6.13×) 28.20 (3.71×) 9500 3000 600 1700
DenseNet 9.23 37.25 (4.04×) 187.45 (20.31×) 74.54 (8.08×) 2500 800 150 400
WideResNet 12.08 37.70 (3.12×) 236.66 (19.59×) 65.72 (5.44×) 3000 1000 160 550
ResNeXt 6.83 19.70 (2.88×) 130.37 (19.09×) 43.65 (6.39×) 4000 1200 260 700
Tiny-ImageNet
CNN-7+BN 22.17 56.54 (2.55×) 4344.05 (195.94×) 98.04 (4.42×) 3600 1100 12 600
DenseNet 50.60 223.63 (4.42×) OOM 474.66 (9.38×) 800 240 OOM 120
WideResNet 98.01 370.68 (3.78×) OOM 604.70 (6.17×) 600 200 OOM 110
ResNeXt 21.52 59.42 (2.76×) 5580.52 (259.32×) 119.34 (5.55×) 3200 900 12 500
C.2 Details on Verifying and Training NLP Models
For the perturbation specification defined on synonym-based word substitution, each word w has a substitution
set S(w), such that the actual input word w′ ∈ {w}∪S(w). We adopt the approach for constructing substitution
sets used by Jia et al. [19]. For a word w in a input sentence, they first follow Alzantot et al. [2] to find
the nearest 8 neighbors of w in a counter-fitted word embedding space where synonyms are generally close
while antonyms are generally far apart. They then apply a language model to only retain substitution words
that the log-likelihood of the sentence after word substitution does not decrease by more than 5.0, which is
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also similar to the approach by Alzantot et al. [2]. We reuse their open-source code2 to pre-compute the
substitution sets of words in all the examples. Note that although we use the same approach for constructing
the lists of substitution words as [19], our perturbation space is still different from theirs, because we follow
Huang et al. [17] and allow setting a small budget δ that limits the maximum number of words to be replaced
simultaneously [23, 10]. We do not adopt the synonym list from Huang et al. [17] as it appears to be not
publicly available.
We use two models in the experiments for sentiment classification: Transformer and LSTM. For Transformer,
we use a one-layer model, with 4 attention heads, a hidden size of 64, and ReLU activations for feed-forward
layers. Following Shi et al. [36], we also remove the variance related terms in layer normalization, which can
make Transformer easier to be verified while keeping comparable clean accuracies. For the LSTM, we use a
one-layer bidirectional model, with a hidden size of 64. The vocabulary is built from the training data and
includes all the words that appear for at least twice. Input tokens to the models are truncated to no longer
than 32.
In the certified training, we have an artifial  that manually shrinks the gap between the clean input
and perturbed input during the warmup stage, which makes the objective easier to be optimized [11, 19].
Specifically, for clean input word wi and actual input word wˆi, we shrink the gap between the embeddings of
wi and wˆi respectively:
e(wˆi)← e(wˆi) + (1− )e(wi).
 is linearly increased from 0 to 1 during the first 10 warmup epochs. We then train the model for 15
more epochs with  = 1. During the first 20 epochs, all the nodes on the parse trees of training examples
are used, and later we only use the root nodes, i.e., the full text only. The models are trained using Adam
optimizer [22], and the learning rate is set to 10−4 for Transformer and 10−3 for LSTM. We also use gradient
clipping with a maximum norm of 10.0. When using LiRPA bounds for training, we combine bounds by
LiRPA and IBP weighted by a coefficient β(0 ≤ β ≤ 1) and (1− β) respectively, and β decreases from 1 to 0
during the warmup stage, following CROWN-IBP [55] as also mentioned in Appendix C.1. In this setting,
since we use pure IBP for training in the last epochs, we actually end up training the models on δ =∞ since
IBP for LSTM and Transformer does not consider δ (see the next paragraph). But we still use LiRPA bounds
with the given non-trivial δ for testing. Alternatively, for IBP+Backward (alt.) in the experiments, we always
use LiRPA bounds and set β = 1. And for this setting, the models tend to have a lower verified accuracy
when tested on a δ larger than that in the training, as shown in Sec. 4.
Huang et al. [17] has a convex hull method to handle word replacement with a budget limit δ in IBP.
For a word sequence w1, w2, · · · , wl, they construct a convex hull for the input node 1. They consider the
perturbation of each word wi, and for each possible wˆi ∈ {wi} ∪ S(wi), they add vector [e(w1···i−1); e(wi) +
δ(e(wˆi)− e(wi)); e(wi+1···l)] to the convex hull. The convex hull is an over-estimation of h1(X). They require
the first layer of the network to be an affine layer and concretize the convex hull to interval bounds after
passing the first layer, where each vertex in the convex hull is passed through the first layer respectively and
they then take the interval lower and upper bound of all the vertexes in the convex hull. They worked on
CNN. However, unlike the situation in CNN, when there is no interaction between different positions in the
first layer, their method is a (δ − 1)-time more over-estimation than simply assuming all the words can be
replaced at the same time. And this method cannot work either when the first layer is not an affine layer.
Therefore, for verifying and training LSTM and Transformer with IBP, we can only adopt the sbaseline in
Jia et al. [19] without considering δ. In contrast, our dynamic programming method for concretizing linear
bounds under the synonym-based word substitution scenario in Sec. 3.2 takes the budget into consideration
regardless of the network structure.
C.3 Details on Training for a Flat Objective
Hyperparameter Setting For training the three-layer MLP model we used in weight perturbation experi-
ments, we follow similar training strategy in vision models. The differences are summarized here: We use the
SGD optimizer with an initial learning rate of 0.1 and decay the learning rate after  increases. We use `2
norm with  = 0.1 to bound the weights of all three layers and linearly increase  per batch.
2https://bit.ly/2KVxIFN
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Certified Flatness. Using bounds obtained from LiRPA, we can obtain a certified upper bound on training
loss. We define the flatness based on certified training cross entropy loss at a point θ∗ = [w∗1,w∗2, · · · ,w∗K ] as:
F = L(−h(x, θ∗, ); y)− L(h(x, θ∗); y) ≥ max
w∈S
L(θ)− L(θ∗) (13)
A small F guarantees that L does not change wildly around θ∗. Note that since the weight of each layer can
be in quite different scales, we use a normalized  = 0.01 and set i = ‖wi‖2. This also allows us to make fair
comparisons between models with weights in different scales. The flatness F of the models we obtained are
shown in Table 9. As we can see, the models trained by “flat” objective show extraordinary smaller flatness F
compare with the nature trained models on bot MNIST and FashionMNIST with all combination of dataset
sizes and batch sizes. The results also fit the observation of training loss landscape in Figure 3b.
Table 9: The flatness F of naturally trained models and models trained using the “flat” objective (13) with
different dataset sizes (10%, 1%) and batch sizes (0.01N , 0.1N , N). A small F guarantees that L does not
change wildly around θ∗ (model parameters found by SGD). The flat objective provably reduces the range of
objective around θ∗.
MNIST
nature training “flat” objective
0.01N 0.1N N 0.01N 0.1N N
10% 2.79 3.45 4.55 0.97 1.12 1.83
1% 2.96 3.85 4.77 1.10 0.95 1.44
FashionMNIST
10% 7.89 7.95 9.60 2.49 1.81 1.94
1% 7.86 6.43 9.55 2.52 1.79 1.98
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